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Constitutional Law-The Destruction of Private Property During War by Military Forces as a Non-compensable Loss-After the
attack on Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the Philippines by Japanese
Forces the American military authorities decided to destroy the oil
terminal facilities in Manila, including the facilities owned by the
plaintiff company. The entire area was prepared for demolition
December 26, 1941. On December 31, 1941, while Japanese troops were
entering Manila, the military forces completed a successful demolition
of all the oil facilities to prevent their falling into the hands of the
Japanese. The plaintiff company brought suit in the U.S. Court of
Claims for compensation for the destruction of the facilities. The
Court of Claims granted the claim.' Held: Reversed. The Supreme
Court ruled that as the facilities were not appropriated for use, but
were taken over only to be destroyed, the demolition of the property
was due to the fortunes of war and so not compensable. United States
v. Caltex (Philippines) et al., 73 S.Ct. 200 (1952).
At the common law, it appears that private property could be
destroyed where public necessity demanded without any compensation
going to the person suffering the loss. 2 This view was recognized as the
common law view in early decisions in the United States and followed
as such.3 However, not all of the early writers on the subject were
convinced of this precept of noncompensability for the taking of private
property, even though done only in instances of public necessity. Vattel,
writing in the late eighteenth century, stated in effect that where there
is a destruction of private property in time of war, the destruction is of
two kinds; the one being destruction wrought by the enemy, which was
a noncompensable loss, and the other being a destruction of private
property deliberately done by the authorities as a precautionary measure,
in which case the owner of the property destroyed should bear no more
than his "quota of the loss."'4 These authorities show the conflict between the common law and some of the early writings, but the entire
direct common law line clearly indicates that there was no compensation
5
payable to one who suffered injury to property due to a public necessity.
Since the earlier cases in the United States mentioned above, there
had been a line of authority developing, mostly by way of dicta and
broad language in some decided cases, in the vein that would appear to
1120

Ct.CI. 518, 100 F.Supp. 970 (1951).

Case of the King's Prerogative in Salt Peter, 12 Coke's Reports 12, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1294 (1607).
3
Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879). See, also Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788).
4 Vattel, The Law of Nations (Chitty's Transl. 1859).
5 "At the common law everyone had the right to destroy real and personal
property, in cases of actual necessity .... and there was no responsibility on
the part of such destroyer, and no remedy for the owner." Bowditch v. City
of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1879).
2
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RECENT DECISIONS

agree with Vattel.6 For example, in the case of Mitchell v. Harmony7
the army had taken over certain equipment specifically for "use" by the
armed forces. The court there said that there are occasions which will
permit private property to be taken for public service, but adds that the
"government is bound to make full compensation to the owner." 8 It
appears from the language used that the military purpose in taking the
property is of much importance. However, Chief Justice Vinson, in the
instant case, specifically states that the language of the court in the
Mitchell case goes well beyond the actual holding of the court therein,
and that therefore the majority of the court refuses to follow that
language.
Instead, the majority of the court in the case under consideration
chose to follow the reasoning of the court in United States v. Pacific
Railroad Co.9 There, though again the problem was not directly before
the court, the court held that where private property is destroyed
through battle, bombardment, or in some other way directly due to war,
there was no compensable taking of the property. It is required of the
military that they do that which is necessary at the time to impede the
advance of an enemy. 10 It is this view, namely that where property is
taken for "destruction" as a public necessity there is no compensation
available to the one who suffers the loss, that is adopted here.
The argument that this was a taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment was adopted by the Court of Claims and
advanced by the dissenting opinion in the principal case. This approach
was summarily dismissed by the majority with a terse statement to the
effect that this was not a taking of property for future "use" by the
military, but that it was a taking for "destruction." This difference in
the military purpose involved in the taking of the property appears to be
the decisive factor in the holding of the court in the instant case.
There can be little doubt of the logistic and strategic value of oil
storage facilities in modern warfare. It seems rather certain that had
these oil facilities not been destroyed before the Japanese temporarily
acquired control of the area, it would have been necessary to destroy
the facilities as soon as possible thereafter as a matter of strategy. All
of the legal authorities seem to be in agreement that there is to be no
compensation for property destroyed by the ravages of -war, and, had
6Supra, note 4.
713 How. 115 (U.S. 1851). See, also, U.S. v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623 (U.S. 1871).
8 13 How. 115 (U.S. 1851).
9 120 U.S. 227, (1887).
10" . . Whatever would embarrass or impede the advance of the enemy, as
the breaking up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or would cripple and
defeat him, as destroying his means of subsistence, were lawfully ordered by
the commanding general. Indeed, it was his imperative duty to direct their
destruction. The necessities of the war called for and justified this . .
Ibid. at 234.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

these oil facilities been destroyed after Japanese occupation, they would
fit such description.
In the light of the authorities in this field, and on a close scrutiny of
the situation involved in the instant case, it appears that the court's
holding is both logical and based on the weight of authority as it exists
today. This does not say that the military forces are free to go about
destroying property at their whim in time of war, but rather it says that
when the necessity of the destruction is clear, even by "hind sight," the
destruction and resulting loss is due to the ravages and fortunes of war,
and done at such a time when "The safety of the state . . . overrides
all considerations of private loss.""
The present status of the law certainly necessitates the result here
arrived at. However, should not some possible moves be made to change
this for the future? Never before in history has continental America
been almost assured of direct attack in the event of global conflict. As
the industrial and production leader of the Americas, the United States
will be the prime target. Both the wealth and strength of the United
States depends to a great extent upon the physical production and
storage facilities. Therefore should not some plan be devised in the
form of insurance or emergency taxation, or a combination of the two,
which would enable the losses due to any direct attack to be borne by
all of the people rather than only by those who actually suffer the
pecuniary loss?
The experiences of post World War II have clearly indicated that
in order to reestablish homes, factories, and other necessities of economic life, which have been ravaged by war, the government and
the entire populace must be willing to bear the burden together or
economic recovery is severely crippled if not completely blocked. The
correctness of the instant decision on legal grounds is not questioned.
The political wisdom of such a policy in the future is doubtful.
HAROLD M.
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